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The aim of this study is to test whether in the Portuguese framework the appointment 
of former politicians to a top management or board firm position is linked to a change 
in firm’s value. If firm’s performance is affected, it will be capitalized into equity prices, 
and we may expect it to be due to the investor’s anticipation of future political 
benefits, such as: easier access to debt financing; lower taxes; power to influence the 
laws under which the firm operates; possibility of winning government contracts, and 
stronger market power. This Business-Government interface has never been studied in 
the context of the Portuguese economy. Thus, to address this issue, this study uses an 
original hand-collected data set based on 46 firms that exchange in the Euronext 
Lisbon, and based on the composition of the Portuguese Constitutional Governments 
from January, 1980 to April, 2012. The results suggest that, in average, the 
appointment of a politically connected executive leads to a negative impact on firm’s 
value which is noticeable by the significant and negative abnormal stock returns. The 
results further suggest that, regardless of the political party to which an executive is 
linked, his appointment is also recognized by investors as a damaging strategy for the 
business.  The only exceptions are the appointments where the number of former 
politicians linked to each party is balanced. Moreover, the results reveal that investors 
tend to alleviate the negative impact of a political appointment when they know which 
position those executives will occupy as well as the level in the corporate governance 
hierarchy to which each position corresponds. However, we should stress that these 
conclusions are limited by the small sample of political appointments – only 23% of our 
appointments are related with the nomination of politically connected executives. 
Moreover, our lack of capacity to control for potential leakage of information prior to 
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Why do have firms interest in having access to political power? Several studies 
(Baysinger, Keim, and Zeithaml, 1985; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Chen, 
Ding, and Kim, 2010) on business research suggest that there is a diversity of benefits 
that may flow to firms that can successfully establish a linkage with the Government. 
Firms have interest in having access to political power, because governmental entities 
influence the opportunity sets faced by firms, shaping their competitive environment. 
Faccio (2006) suggests that politically connected firms may have preferential 
treatment in competion for Government contracts. Moreover, governmental entities 
are responsible for the three broad areas of regulation - antitrust regulation, economic 
regulation, and social regulation- which are crucial for any area of business today. 
Moreover, Government expenditures represent a huge portion of business for a 
variety of firms (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999). The attention that 
management researchers have been given to this Government-business interface 
suggests, at least, the popular perception that benefits of the Government service may 
spillover to private sector, adding value to the firms. In fact, nowadays is hard to find 
any area of business that is not somehow affected by the Government.  
Despite its popularity, corporate political connections is a relatively new research area 
in the economic literature, and this study will explore evidence about the relationship 
that can be established, in the Portuguese case, between high-level corporate political 
connections and changes in firm’s value as a result of a linkage with the political 
power. Our interest is to explore if political connections are also important to add 
value when the framework is an economy which has a well developed financial market 
as well as robust legal system. Given this, our challenge is to investigate whether, in 
the Portuguese scenario, the appointment of former politicians that begin serving in a 
top management or board firm position is linked to a change in firm’s value. According 
with the general results provided by the literature on this field of research (Goldman, 
Rocholl, and So, 2006), to address this question we will assert the hypothesis that 
when individuals with political experience or political ties are appointed to industry, 
that is, when a link is established between a firm and the Government through this 




anticipation of future political benefits. If political connections matter, then the 
nomination of politically connected board members is capitalized into equity prices 
and a company’s value goes up. These nominations are not mere preferences of the 
industry. However, one may think that strong political ties can also decrease firm value 
due to the risk that politically connected board members may divert firm resources in 
order to serve other political goals. Actually, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) emphasizes 
that politically connected executives may extract at least some of the rents generated 
by connections, and firm’s value will be enhanced only when the marginal benefits of 
the connections outweigh their marginal costs.   
In order to address our goal, we use the event study methodology. This approach 
allows us to confidently determine whether there is an abnormal stock price effect 
related with a specific unanticipated event. We also assume our own definition of 
political connections which is based on detailed data on the former political positions 
held by each board member appointed by each firm that exchange on the Euronext 
Lisbon. Since there are other drivers for a firm to get connected, the level of political 
connections which we pretend to perform in this study will be a lower bound on the 
actual degree of political lobby. To get our sample of appointments we look to all the 
announcements made by each firm to the Comissão do Mercado de Valores 
Mobiliários (CMVM) between the periods of January, 2000 to April, 2012.  
It is important to highlight the lack of previous empirical research in this specific type 
of corporate political behavior, which proved to be one of our major difficulties for this 
analysis to be done. Another limitation regarding this study was the dimension of our 
sample, which is relatively small. We measured the firm’s performance as the daily 
stock quotes, thus our sample becomes restricted to the firms that exchange in the 
Euronext Lisbon. Notwithstanding, our sample experienced a further constraint, since 
the politically connected firms represent the minority of these firms. However, this 
sampling issue should not distract us from our main findings which consistently 
suggest that, on average, political connections jeopardize firm’s performance.  
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature. 




the variables we compute. Section 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 presents 
the empirical analysis and the main results of this study. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Research on corporate political activity has gained increasing recognition since the 
publication of several important studies on the matter (Fleming, 1980; Thai, 1980; 
Grefe, 1981; Sethi, 1981; Baysinger, and Keim, 1982; Faccio, and Masulis, 2005; Faccio, 
and Parsley, 2006; Leuz, and Oberhelzer-Gee, 2006; Faccio, 2006, 2009; Fisman, 2001). 
These studies reveal similar conclusions regarding the evidence that political forces 
constrain the strategic decisions of multinational firms. Firms that are able to create a 
linkage with the Government may benefit from a reduction in uncertainty, reduced 
transaction costs, privileged information, access, influence and legitimacy 
(Galaskiewicz, and Wasserman, 1989; Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Chen, 
Ding, and Kim, 2010). For instance, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006), and 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) suggest that political connected firms are less 
dependent from the public in what concerns the need to raise capital, because they 
can get access to privileged loans from banks that are under political influence. 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman (1999) also suggest that high-level politically 
connected firms are able not only to influence the regulatory process in a way more 
favorable to the firm, but also have increased access to Government contracts. Fisman 
(2001), and Facccio, and Parsley (2006) demonstrate in their studies that when 
Government officials lose their political influence, firm value with which they were 
connected diminishes. 
 Moreover, Crispin (2002) show that political connections significantly affect firm’s 
performance not only in emerging markets, but also in developed economies.  
However, while in theory Government relations and strategies may create value for 
firms, empirically it is difficult to link these activities to measurable performance at the 
firm level. Political connections are a nonmarket behavior, thus the nature of the direct 
benefits of the Government service is not easily measured (Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 




Scholars that study corporate political activity (Zeithman et al., in press; Baysinger, 
Keim, and Zeithman, 1985) indicate that the traditional political strategies of direct 
lobbying and corporate campaign contributions have been complemented or replaced 
in many firms by more sophisticated approaches. These more recent strategies include 
campaign contributions through political actions committees (PAC), advocacy 
advertising, corporate constituency programs, and inter-organizational linkages. 
Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman (1999) stressed the role of personal service as a 
means of inter-organizational linkage, and by assuming a critical distinction– instead of 
two organizations where a decision-maker from one firm becomes a decision-maker in 
another, we will consider the scenario where one of the organizations is the 
Government- they showed that the benefits that generally result from inter-
organizational linkages and interlocking directorates between two firms also result 
from a linkage between a firm and the Government through personal service. 
However, these authors only studied the effect on firm performance of a type of 
personal service– when a member of a firm’s top management team or board of 
directors begins serving in a nominated or elected political position. In this way, they 
provided suspicion that the reverse direction- when those individuals with political 
background or ties go to industry- may also create firm-specific benefits which can be 
captured in advance by the markets, leading to changes in firm’s value. Investors view 
turnover appointments as good news presaging improved management and higher 
cash flows.  
3. Data description 
We now look the data we use to analyze the impact of the announcements of former 
politicians that begin serving in a top management or board firm positions on firm´s 
value.  
3.1. Announcements data 
As we said before, we will focus our analysis on firms that trade in Euronext Lisbon, so 




To compute the announcements data, we went to the Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Imobiliários (CMVM) official website1  and we rely on their information 
available to the public. Then, to each security issuers we took the information related 
with the day and hour of each appointment, the executives nominated in each 
appointment as well as their corporate functions. This data was collected in the time 
period between January, 2000 and April, 2012.  We were then forced to exclude one of 
our initial 47 firms, because there was no information available for Portucel Soporcel 
Group on these topics. Our final sample of announcements is then composed by 46 
firms, 402 announcements and 2536 executives appointed.  
3.2 Political data 
We can have two types of announcements: political announcements and non political 
announcements. We assume that an announcement is political when within the set of 
executives appointed there is at least one executive that at any time before the day of 
the nomination held a position such as Prime Minister, Minister or Secretary of State 
during one of the Portuguese Constitutional Governments. This condition leaves out 
the case of board members who have not political ties at the time of the nomination.  
Following this idea, we say that a firm has political connections when, at least one of 
the executives nominated by the firm, during the period of January, 2001 to April 
2012, is politically connected. 
In order to address this challenge, that is, identify who among all the executives 
nominated, has political connections, we went to the Portuguese Government 
website2 and we collected all the data related to the composition of each 
Constitutional Government from January, 1980 to April, 2012.  We get a hand database 
composed by 14 Governments.  
After that, we match the announcements data with this political data so that we are 
able to identify which executives have political connections and which appointments 
can be considered political. At this point, we have considered the appointments of 
three particular executives as an exception to that criterion, because their political ties 







are prior to the year of 1980. Their strong political connections combined with the 
frequency with which they are appointed for several corporate positions, in different 
firms, lead us to not neglect them.3 
Table 1: Sample composition 
Nº Firms Nº Appointments (N) Nº Political appointments Nº Politically 
connected firms 




Source: Author’s calculations based on political data. 
Table 1 shows that within our final sample, 65% of our firms have some political 
connections and 23% of our appointments are political.   
An interesting point we can highlight is that, among our 93 political appointments, 
none of them is due to the appointment of a woman with political past. Actually, only 
male executives reveal to have political ties.  
4. Variables 
It may be argued that the announcement effect on firm’s value is not only due to the 
unique political characteristics of the executives appointed. Following this idea, we 
decide to stress two possible reasons according to which an appointment can have 
impact on firm’s value. We consider that an announcement can have both a corporate 
and political components, and we have several ways to perform it. In what follows we 
will give a detailed description of the variables we compute to capture that different 
effects.  
4.1. Corporate variables  
The Corporate Governance of a firm is relatively complex and we can find several 
positions with different functions. For example, we can believe that the chairman of 
the Board of Directors has a different contribution to the firm than the Corporate 
Secretary has.  On the one hand, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004) find that 
                                                             
3
 We refer to the cases of Artur Eduardo Brochado Santos Silva, Daniel Proença de Carvalho, and José 




decisions made by principal officers can create or destroy wealth on a large scale, 
because they play a key economic role. On the other hand, Denis and Denis (1995) 
report insignificant abnormal returns around the announcement of turnovers that do 
not involve the top executive and find no significant change in operating performance 
following such appointments. In this way, we decide to rank those different positions 
according with the position they occupy in the hierarchy of the corporate governance 
structure, giving to each of them a score in a range between 0 and 10. 
 We find two different ways of doing it. The first one is more objective and is based on 
the fixed salaries declared by each firm on their most recent Annual Report and 
Accounts. According with this approach we give 10 points to the corporate position 
with the highest salary and the other board positions will receive a score based on 
their relative salary to the highest one. However, we face some difficulties when 
proceeding this way: there is a huge lack of information regarding the fixed salaries of 
each corporate position; there is no consistency of corporate positions neither within 
the same firm along the time, nor between different firms. Since the first approach 
failed we turn to an alternative method.  Although being a subjective procedure, it is 
based on each corporate position functions. Appendix 1 shows in detail the corporate 
points we attributed to each board position. 
For each appointment we compute three corporate variables: the average corporate 
position, the maximum corporate position and the sum of corporate positions.  
The average corporate position variable is the simple average of the total points of the 
announcementi: 
Formula 1: 
                            
                       
                           
 
where                   




The sum of corporate position variable is simply the sum of scores of each position that 
comprises each appointment: 
Formula 2 
                                                         
 
   
 
with                   and j= number of nominated executives by appointment4.  












Average 5 6 31 6 
Quartile 25 3 3 4 1 
Quartile 50 
(Median) 
5 6 9 2 
Quartile 75 6 10 38 9 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 10 10 276 47 
Standard 
deviation 
2 3 42 8 
Source: Author's calculations based on corporate data. 
 
Table 3 reports some basic statistic measures of our corporate variables. As we can 
observe, the average score of each appointment amounts to 5. However, when we 
consider the average maximum score this value increases to 6, and when we consider 
the sum criterion, the average markedly increases to 31 points. The maximum score 
we can get is the value 10, and it corresponds to the case where the chairman of the 
Board of Directors is appointed. The minimum score an appointment can get is 1. 
                                                             
4
 Despite the number of executives nominated by appointment show large variation, in average, each 
appointment comprises 6 executives’ nominations.  




Among the three criteria, the sum of the corporate points is the one that stresses the 
most the corporate importance of the appointment.  
In what concerns the number of executives nominated by appointment, there is not a 
typical behavior.  In average, an appointment is composed by 6 board members. 
However, we can get situations of 47 executives being nominated. This diversity is 
reinforced by the fact that only 25% of the appointments are composed by more than 
9 members.  
4.2. Political variables 
As we mentioned above, we say that an executive has political connections when he, 
at some point in time prior to the day of the announcement, held a political position 
such as Prime Minister, Minister or Secretary of State. Following that political 
hierarchy, we can give a weight to each nominated executive according with his 
political past. Table 4 of Appendix 2 shows the valuation we made. 
Following that procedure, and taking into account the number of times each political 
connected executive held a certain political position, we can compute for each 
appointment a variable that is a composite political weight.  
Table 5 – Political variables – Political weight  




Sum of political 
position 
Average 0.7 4 6 
Quartile 25 0.2 1 2 
Quartile 50  
(Median) 
0.3 2 3 
Quartile 75 1 4 9 
Minimum 0.03 1 1 
Maximum 10 14 31 
Standard deviation 1.2 4 7 
Source: Author’s calculations based on political variables. 
                                                             




Table 5 reports some important information about the political appointments. The low 
values for the average political position means that, in average, each set of executives 
appointed is composed by few political connected board members. The outlier 10 
relates to an appointment where only one executive is announced. Actually, this is the 
appointment of Jorge Paulo Sacadura Almeida Coelho, which was Minister for five 
times, for the Board of Directors of Martifer, on the 19th of February, 2009.  The 
maximum political value of an appointment is 14, and it corresponds to the 
appointment of Álvaro de Pinho Bissaia Barreto, which was Minister for seven times, to 
the Board of Directors of Banco Comercial Português (BCP), on the 6th of February, 
2012.  
An alternative approach7 to that composite weight is to create a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1, if the appointment is political, and takes the value 0 otherwise. We 
label this dummy with the name Political Appointment. This second criterion does not 
consider that different political classes may lead to different effects on the change in 
firm´s value.  Actually, it only considers that there may be a different effect depending 
on whether an executive has a political past or not.  
A third way to look at the political board connections is to sort our sample in 
accordance with the political party that is largely represented in each appointment. To 
do that, we create four dummy variables. The first dummy variable created, Socialist 
Majority, takes the value 1 if the majority of the political connected executives 
nominated in the appointmenti
8
 have filiations with Socialist Party. It takes the value 0 
otherwise. The second dummy we compute, Democratic Majority, takes the value 1 if 
the number of politically connected executives having filiations with the Social 
Democratic Party or with the Party of the Democratic and Social Center/ Popular Party 
(CDS/ PP) is the majority. The third dummy computed, Balanced Appointment, takes 
the value 1 when the number of political connected executives having political 
filiations with Socialist Party or other party from the left is exactly equal to the number 
of political connected executives that have filiations with Social Democratic Party or 
other party from the right. It takes the value 0 otherwise. Finally, the fourth dummy 
                                                             
7
 This alternative approach is the one we use in the empirical section of this study. 




we create, Ruling Party, captures the linkage between the party that is majorly 
represented in the appointment and the ruling party. In this way, Ruling Party takes 
the value 1 if the majorly represented party in the appointment is the same that was 
ruling at the time of the appointment. When these four dummy variables are equal to 
0, then the appointment is composed only by executives without political ties. 









dummies  (=1) 
28 52 13 73 
Source: Author’s calculations based on political variables. 
Table 6 shows that among our 402 appointments: 73 are appointments such that the 
party majorly represented by the politically connected executives appointed is the 
same than the ruling party at that time; 28 are appointments such that the majority of 
the politically connected executives nominated are affiliated to the Socialist Party; 52 
are appointments where dominates the affiliations to the Social Democratic Party or 
with the CDS/ PP, and 13 are appointments where the number of politically connected 
executives from both party is in equilibrium. The remaining 309 are non political 
appointments. 
5. Event study methodology 
As we said before, the purpose of this study is to test the effect of a board nomination 
of a former politician on the change of firm’s value.  A correct way to assess the 
financial impact of changes in corporate policy, whether endogenous or exogenous, is 
to use the event study methodology. This approach allows us to confidently determine 
whether there is an abnormal stock price effect related with a specific unanticipated 
event9.   
                                                             
9
 We assume that the moment when a firm appoints an executive to a corporate position is only known 
by the market and investors when it is published by the CMVM. We are assuming that there are not 




We will follow Mc Williams and Siegel (1997), and use the traditional approach to 
obtain estimates of abnormal returns. We run market model regressions of the 
realized daily stock returns10 for event portfolio  11,     , on a measure of the realized 
daily returns of the market index12,    ,  and a set of      daily event dummies,     , 
                     , which take the value of 1 for days inside the event 
window13 (   ) and 0 outside the window.  
Formula 3 
                        
 
    
      
The coefficients     measure the daily abnormal returns inside the event window. 
These abnormal returns are assumed to capture the stocks market’s reaction to the 
arrival of new information.  
In what follows, we assume always three different event windows. The first one 
considers the 10 days prior to the event, as well as the 10 days after the event. The 
second window analyzes the 3 days prior and after the event, and the last window 
comprises the day before and the day after of the appointment. Our estimation 
window comprises the 250 days prior to the day of the event. The nontrading of 
certain stocks is a recurrent situation on the Euronext Lisbon. Thus, in order to prevent 
nonsynchronous trading between the security’s daily prices and the PSI 20, which 
functions as the Portuguese financial benchmark, we correct each security’s daily 
returns series by adding the value 0 when there is no trading. 
Sums of the daily abnormal return estimates,    , over various windows yield 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) estimates. 
                                                             
10 We use the daily returns gross of dividends instead of the normal daily returns because they have less 
noise. Thus, they allow us to better control for confounding effects.  
These returns are available at Bloomberg data base. 
11              .  
12
 For this purpose we use the PSI20 Index. We obtain this series from Bloomberg data base. 
13
 As we said before, we define an event to be the date of an appointment of a board member or set of 




We get three different CARs series, one for each event window. Since we are dealing 
with daily data, we decide to use the normalized14 CARs instead of the traditional 
CARs, because in this way we can get even more accurate results.  
Table 7: CARs (%) – Descriptive statistics 
 CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1,+1) 
N 40115 402 402 
Mean 0.000 -0.188 -0.545 
Quartile 25 -1.79 -3.515 -4.256 
Quartile 50 -0.135 -0.171 -0.596 
Quartile 75 1.612 2.753 3.616 
Source: Author’s calculations based on CARs series. 
Table 7 reports some descriptive statistics for the normalized CARs series we get. As 
we can observe, only the CARs series for the event window (-10, +10) has a clear null 
mean. These results suggest that, in average, the cumulative abnormal returns around 
the event are negative.  
In order to test the statiscally significance of the cumulative abnormal returns, we have 
to assume the standard assumption that the values of CARi are independent and 
identically distributed. In this ways, we can compute the average cumulative abnormal 
returns (ACAR) as follows: 
Formula 4 
      
     
 
   
         
 
where              , N = 402, and where std dev corresponds to the standard 
deviation of CARi. 
The test statistic we use to test whether the ACAR is statiscally significant different 
from zero is (null hypothesis): 
                                                             
14 To normalize a CARs series, we just need do divide each car by the standard deviation of the series.  
15
 For the CARs (-10, +10) series, we were forced to exclude one observation, because there were no 






         
    
We repeat this procedure for each event window. Appendix 3 reports the statistics we 
get. As we can observe, for the event window composed by the 10 days prior and the 
10 days after the event, we should reject the hypothesis of significant average 
cumulative abnormal returns different from zero. For the other event windows, we 
should not reject that hypothesis. Thus, CARs for the 3 days prior and after the vent, 
and for the days before and after the event, are statiscally significant different from 
zero.  
6. Empirical results 
Now that we have the CARs series for the three event windows, we are able to run 
cross-sectional regressions of each CARs series on our set of explanatory variables, and 
test whether political appointments are capitalized by the market into equity prices, as 
an anticipation of futures political benefits. In what follows, this empirical section is 
organized in three parts. The first part tests the different effects of political 
appointments and non political appointments on firm’s value. The second part adds to 
the political component of an appointment the corporate component, and tests 
whether there are effects on firm´s value. Finally, the third part tests if there are 
different effects on firm’s value, depending on when we are dealing with an 
appointment that is reported for the first time, or a reappointment.  
6.1. Empirical results – Political component analysis 
We say that an executive has political connections when he, at some point in time 
prior to the day of the announcement, held a political position such as Prime Minister, 
Minister or Secretary of State, at least during one of the Portuguese Constitutional 
Governments from January, 1980 to April, 2012. Following this criterion, we define 
political appointment as an appointment where at least one executive with those 




Appendix 4 presents the relation between the stock returns of our sample of 46 firms 
and 402 appointments16, and our definitions for political and non political 
appointments.  
We run each cumulative abnormal return, CARs (-10, +10), CARs (-3, +3), and CARs (-1, 
+1) on a dummy, Political Appointment, that capture whether an appointment is 
political or not. As we can observe neither the dummy, nor the constant are statiscally 
significant whatever the event window considered. These results suggest that the 
market does not react to an appointment when he only knows if there are politically 
connected executives or not. Actually, this is a naïve definition of political connections, 
because investors can get access to information that allows them to go beyond than 
that to forecast performance changes related with such appointments. Since investors 
can get information about the name of the individuals that are being nominated, they 
can easily know which type of political filiations each executive has; they can know to 
what political party are the executives connected; they can react to the possibility of 
the political party majorly represented in the appointment be the same or not than the 
one that is in the Government at the moment of the appointment. In this way, a more 
robust analysis will imply that we introduce explanatory variables that control for 
these different dimensions of a political appointment. 
Appendix 5 provides results on this deeper analysis. We test for the impact of political 
connections, but now considering a set of dummy variables that control for different 
political dimensions. We repeat the procedure for different event windows. The 
variable Socialist Majority takes the value 1 if the appointment is composed by 
politically connected executives and the majority has affiliation to Socialist Party. By 
the contrary, the dummy Democratic Majority takes the value 1 if the majority of the 
politically connected executives appointed are linked to the Social Democratic Party or 
to CDS/ PP. Variable Balanced Appointment controls for the situations where the 
number of politically connected executives linked to a party is exactly equal to the 
number of executives politically linked to the other party. Dummy Ruling Party allows 
                                                             
16
 For the cumulative abnormal returns computed for the event window (-10, +10) we only analyzed 401 




to test whether a firm can benefit when the political appointment is majorly 
represented by the election winning party. 
 The first conclusion we can infer is that the statiscal significance of the variables 
increases as long as we restrict the size of the event window, suggesting that the 
market not only does not react to an appointment with much anticipation, as well as 
does not capitalize the effects for so long. In column 1, we can observe that only the 
coefficient for Ruling Party is statiscally significant, suggesting that when an 
appointment is majorly represented by board members linked to the party that is in 
the Government it has a negative effect on firm’s value. A possible reason is that 
investors anticipate future leakage of private information from the firm to the 
Government which can be harmful for the business. As if this is not enough, investors 
can recognize that the politically connected executives appointed are serving first the 
interests of the Government than the interests of the company.  
The same analysis for the event window (-3, +3) leads to more interesting results. 
When all the dummies are equal to 0, then the appointment is not political connected 
and the effect is captured by the constant. Since its coefficient is not statiscally 
significant, we can believe that the market is indifferent to these appointments. 
Indeed, they neither add, nor take value to the firm. By the contrary, when politically 
connected executives are being nominated, the market reacts differently. Dummies 
Democratic Majority, Balanced Appointment, and Ruling Party are significant at the 5% 
level, and Socialist Majority is significant at the 1% level. 
 The results suggest that there is a negative effect on cumulative abnormal stock 
returns whenever a firm appoints to its corporate governance executives that are 
politically connected. The only exception is the case of a balanced political 
appointment. If we think on business strategy as an action that lasts in time, then it 
may be an added value when an appointment is composed by both parties because in 
this way, the firm can always benefit whatever the ruling party. Indeed, we can think 
on this result as being reinforced by the negative sign of dummy Ruling Party. When an 
appointment is majorly composed by politically connected executives linked to the 




executives linked to the opposite side of the Government. We can conclude that the 
market does not think only on the short-term decisions, and feels more confident 
when all the political scenarios are considered. The same holds true for the event 
window (-1, +1) as we can observe in column 1, table 10. When we are considering the 
day prior to the event and the day immediately after, what we can observe is that the 
effect of political appointments is enhanced relatively to the event window (-3, +3).  
6.2. Empirical results - Political and corporate components analysis  
As we said before, this study attempts to go beyond the political characteristics of an 
appointment. Indeed, there may be different effects on firm’s value regarding the 
different corporate position to which an executive is appointed. Following this idea, we 
rank the corporate governance structure according with three different methods. The 
first one is based on the sum of the corporate points of the set of executives 
appointed; the second approach is based on the maximum score within the set of 
executives nominated by appointment, and the last method takes the average 
corporate scores of an appointment.  
Appendix 6 shows the results of the regression of each CAR on a set of explanatory 
variables which are controlling for both political and corporate effects. The variable 
sum of corporate points tries to capture the effect of the appointments taking into 
account their different corporate weights. For example, it may be different for the 
strategy of the firm if the appointment relates to the nomination of an official 
accounts auditor or if it relates to the chief financial officer (CFO). The variable 
interacts with political dummies, Socialist Majority, Democratic Majority, Ruling Party, 
and Balanced Appointment to test how the corporate component relates with the 
political component of the nomination. For example, we can think that investors 
anticipate different effects when a politically connected executive is nominated as 
chairman of the board of the executive committee or when he is nominated as 
alternate corporate secretary.  
In column 1 of table 11, we can observe that any variable is significant. This situation 
changes when we center our analysis for shorter periods surrounding the event. The 




anticipation, nor many days after. The market seems to capitalize the appointments’ 
effects on equity prices relatively quickly. Indeed, the same result is shown on 
Appendix 5, as we already analyzed.  
For the window of three days prior and three days after the day of the appointment, 
only the constant and the variable sum of corporate points are not statiscally 
significant. The remainder, Balanced Appointment*sum, Socialist Majority*sum, 
Democratic Majority*sum, and Ruling Party*sum are all statistically significant. The 
first one is statiscally significant at the 10% level, the following two are significant at 
the 5% level and the last one is significant at the 1% level. For the statistically 
significant terms, the sign of the coefficients seems to be consistent with what 
happens on the previous model (appendix 5). The terms Socialist Majority*sum, 
Democratic Majority*sum, and Ruling Party*sum have a negative impact on firm´s 
value. However, when compared to the previous case, these effects are now quieter. 
This means that knowing the role each politically connected executive will play in the 
firm allows investors to anticipate the future negative effects, and this way, capitalize 
that effects in a way less damaging to the firm.  The term Balanced Appointment*sum 
has a positive coefficient and its effects on cumulative abnormal returns is more 
discrete when compared to the coefficient of Balanced Appointment on the previous 
model (column 3, table 10). 
Another common behavior relates to the appointments’ effect for the event window 
composed by the day prior and the day after the day of the event.  For this regression, 
both sum of corporate points and the constant are not statiscally significant. In 
average, the level of significance of the remainder variables increases, and their 
coefficients suggest the same negative impact we saw before.  
In sum, accordingly with the previous results, we should highlight the following topics: 
the market does not react to an appointment, nor with much anticipation, nor many 
days before the event; the more closer to the day of the event, more the market 
internalizes the effect of the appointments; non politically connected executives are 
not seen by the market as drivers of value added even when the positions for which 




executives linked to each party is in balance, the appointment’s effect is positive. 
Otherwise, the market recognizes the political appointments as treat to the business.   
To address the effect on firms´ value of the corporate component of an appointment, 
we repeat the same regressions, but now using two different corporate measures, the 
maximum corporate points and the average corporate points, instead of the sum. 
Appendix 7 reports the results for the regression of CARs on a set of explanatory 
variables based on the maximum corporate points approach, and Appendix 8 reports 
the results for the average corporate points’ method.  
We can jointly analyze both tables 12 and 13, because the results reveal a common 
pattern. When we look to column 1, in both tables, none of the variables considered 
are statiscally significant. The persistence of this result give us confidence about what 
we said previously when we were analyzing table 11. Actually, the market does not 
internalize the effect of an appointment with so many days of difference from the day 
of the event. This result is reinforced by the increasing statiscally significance of the 
variables from the event window (-3, +3) to the event window (-1, +1). Once again, and 
for both models, the constant is not significant, meaning that investors do not 
recognize that non political connected executives can bring an abnormal return to the 
business. They are indifferent to such appointments. Another factor of indifference is 
the corporate weight of an appointment per se. Indeed, neither the maximum of 
corporate points in table 12, nor the average of corporate points in table 13, are 
statiscally significant. This corporate component only reveals importance when 
combined with the political characteristics of the appointment. Now, as we saw in 
table 11, when considering the sum of the corporate points of an appointment, the 
interaction terms are all significant and the coefficients are negative with the 
exception of the coefficient of the variable Balanced Appointment*max (table 12) and 
Balanced Appointment*average (table13).  
Once again, these results suggest that the market believes that is damaging for the 
business to appoint politically connected executives when they are majorly 
representing one of the two dominant parties. The same happens when the majority 




contrary, investors recognize that a balance between the two parties is crucial to add 
value to the firm.  
The persistence of same results from table 11 to table 13 leads us to confidently 
conclude that the market is indifferent to a non political appointment, whatever its 
composition as well as its corporate weight. By the reverse, when the market has 
information such that it can distinguish among the political appointments, which 
appointments are majorly linked to a specific party and which appointments are linked 
to the ruling party, investors anticipate future damages to the business, and the 
consequence is a negative abnormal return for the period surrounding the event. 
However, this effect can be relief if the investors know what role those politically 
connected executives will play in the corporate structure of the firm. These results are 
not consistent with the initial assumption we made. In the beginning of this study, and 
following the international literature on board members’ turnovers, we set the 
hypothesis that when a politically connected executive is appointed as a board 
member or as a top manager, markets anticipate future political benefits to the firm, 
such as privileged access to information, reduced uncertainty and reduced transaction 
costs, and (indirect) participation on the regulatory process.  In this way, equity prices 
of the firm rise, generating positive abnormal returns. 
6.3. Empirical results – The difference between the first appointment and a 
reappointment 
When a firm appoints an executive to become a top manager or a board member, the 
existing board has the opportunity to appoint a successor with greater ability than the 
departing member. However, according with some authors (Borokhovich et al, 1996, 
and Chan, 1996) investors can react differently regarding when it is an insider17 
appointment or an outsider appointment. They suggest that the appointment of an 
executive from outside the firm is understood by the market as more beneficial than 
an inside appointment. They argue that it is more costly to appoint an outsider, thus, a 
firm will not appoint an outsider unless the incremental improvement relative to an 
insider candidates is expected.  
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Following this idea, we decide to test if there are different expected abnormal returns 
depending on whether it is an appointment of an outsider (appointment) or an 
appointment of an insider (reappointment)18. To address this purpose, we look to our 
appointments sample, and we take only those appointments in which the chairman of 
the board of directors is announced. Then, for each firm, we assume the starting point 
of this analysis the first time the chairman of the board of directors is appointed. 
According with this criterion, we can distinguish which executives within the 
appointments considered, those that are being nominated for the first time and those 
that are being reappointed. After that, we repeat the same procedures we already 
presented in section 6.1.. Appendix 9 reports the results we get.  
The variable First Appointment is equal to 1 when the majority of the executives are 
appointed for the first time. It takes the value 0 when the majority are executives that 
are being reappointed. As we can observe, the variable First Appointment is not 
statistically significant whatever the event window considered. This suggests that 
investors are indifferent to this kind of distinction. Once again, the market only reacts 
to the political components of an appointment, and this reaction is more evident as 
the day of the event gets closer. In column 3, the number of statiscally significant 
variables is higher than the one for column 1 and 2. In column 3, both Socialist 
Majority and Ruling Party are statiscally significant at the 1% level. The variables 
Balanced Appointment and Democratic Majority are significant at the 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. The constant is not significant meaning that the market neither 
reacts to non political appointments, nor to reappointments. The signs for Socialist 
Majority, Democratic Majority, and Ruling Party are once again negative, meaning that 
invertors do not view these appointments as good news for firm’s performance 
improvements. Only the coefficient of Balanced Appointment is positive, suggesting 
that investors presage good news, when the politically connected executives 
appointed linked to each party, independently of being nominated for the first time or 
reappointed, are represented in the same proportion.  
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This study attempts to explore whether the announcement of politically connected 
executives can have impact on firm’s value. The framework is the Portuguese economy 
which has a strong legal system, developed financial markets, and low levels of 
political corruption. To address this challenge, we set the hypothesis that if political 
connections matter, then the appointment of a politically connected executive as a top 
manager or board member will lead to an increase in firm’s value which will be 
recognized by the market and capitalized into equity prices as an anticipation of future 
political benefits, such as: easier access to debt financing; lower taxes; power to 
influence the laws under which the firm operate; possibility of winning government 
contracts, and stronger market power. 
To perform this goal, we run several cross sectional regressions of the cumulative 
abnormal returns for three different event windows, on a set of explanatory variables 
which control for the political component and corporate weight of an appointment.  
The results we get are robust and consistent across all the analysis we perform, and 
they lead us to reject our initial hypothesis that politically connected executives add 
value to the firm. 
In average, investors react negatively to a political appointment, unless the 
appointment illustrates appropriate balance power. When the majority of the 
politically connected executives are linked to one of the dominant parties in Portugal, 
that is, to the Socialist Party or to the Social Democratic Party, and CDS/ PP, then 
investors anticipate that these political ties will jeopardize firm’s value. The same holds 
when the party majorly represented in the appointment is the ruling party. These 
negative effects are more pronounced as we get closer to the day of the appointment.  
These pervasive effects that political connections have on firm performance may be 
associated with the conflict of interests between the Government and the private 
sector. Investors can see those executives as a Government channel for firms to pursue 
political objectives.  In this way, political ties can lead to a misallocation of 




activities which can be costly when firms operate in a scenario where such practices 
are illegal and severely punished.  
When we test for the corporate weigh of each appointment, we find that this 
information only reveals significance when combined with the political component of 
the appointments. In average, investors tend to alleviate the pervasive effect of 
political appointments on firm’s performance when they know which role will those 
politically connected executives play in the corporate structure of the firm, and what is 
the level such positions occupy in the hierarchy of the corporate governance.  
Despite our conclusions, we should stress that even though stock price reactions 
around the time of executives’ appointments reflect investors’ expectations regarding 
the future performance of the firm, they do not reveal the outcome themselves.   
Another important limitation of this study relates to the fact that in Portugal does not 
exist any structure pioneered online information   that allow us to get access to 
premium information sources, like Lexis-Nexis19 in the Unites States of America (USA). 
In this way, it is impossible for us to control for possible leakage of information 
regarding an appointment. For instance, we can believe that an appointment is 
preceded by some rumors. However, we have no tolls to identify when those rumors 
started coming out in press. In order to bypass this limitation, we were forced to 
assume that there is no leakage of information surrounding an appointment. As a 
consequence of this limitation, the unique contribution of our study is in showing that 
the impact of political connections on firm’s value is more likely to be due to the 
investors’ expectations that these connections provide firms with political influence. 
Finally, we should stress that the evidence presented in this study, although a pioneer 
in Portugal, opens several doors for future research. In particular, it will be interesting 
to explore whether the impact on stock price may not only be due to the fact that a 
board member is politically connected, but also to his expertise. For instance, we can 
believe that the contribution to a construction firm of a politically connected executive 
whose political past is linked to the construction sector and real estate tend to be 
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higher than the contribution of a politically connected executive whose political past is 
linked to the education sector.  
8. Appendices 
Appendix 1  
Table 2 – Corporate Governance structure and corporate points 
We look the corporate structure of a firm, and we give to each position a score based on the 
specific functions and contributions of that position to the firm. To do that, we define a scale 
from 0 to 10, and we look to each firm’s corporate governance. After that, we try to establish a 
criterion such that it is the most transversal possible to all the 46 firms.   
Corporate Governance 
Structure 
Corporate Position Points 
Board of Directors 
Chairman - Executive  10 
Chairman - Non Executive  9 
Deputy Chairman - Executive  8 
Deputy Chairman - Non Executive  7 
Member - Executive 6 
Member - Non Executive 5 
Alternate Member - Executive 4 






Chairman - Executive 7 
Chairman - Non Executive 6 
Deputy Chairman - Executive 6 
Deputy Chairman - Non Executive 5 
Member - Executive 4 
Member - Non Executive 3 
Secretary 2 





Board of General Meeting 
Chairman - Executive 6 
Chairman - Non Executive 5 
Deputy Chairman - Executive 5 





Alternate Member 3 
Secretary 2 
Alternate Secretary 1 
Executive Committee 
Chairman (CEO) 9 
Deputy Chairman (CFO) 7 
Member  5 












Alternate Member 1 
Others 
Market Relations Representative 2 
Official Accounts Auditor 2 
Alternate Official Accounts Auditor 1 
Corporate Secretary 2 
Alternate Corporate Secretary 1 












Appendix 2  
Table 4 – Valuation of each executive in accordance with his political past (procedure 
1) 
We define a politically connected executive as an executive who held, at any day prior to the 
day of the appointment, a political position such has Prime Minister, Minister or Secretary of 
State. Considering this political hierarchy, we decide to give to each political position a score, 
in a range from 0 to 3. The score 0 relates to the cases when the executive nominated has not 
a political past.  
Executives Weight 
Political connected executive 
Prime Minister 3 
Minister 2 
Secretary of State 1 
Non political connected executive 0 
Source: These numbers are based on author’s methodology to address the political hierarchy. 
Appendix 3 
Table 8: Statiscally significance of CARs 
Assuming that CARs series are independent and identically distributed, we perform a statistical 
test in order to check the significance of the CARs. The null hypothesis is that the average 
cumulative abnormal returns are statistically significant different from 0, so then the CARs are. 
The Z stat follows a normal distribution. Robust p-values are indicated in parentheses. Symbols 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 CAR (-10, +10) CAR (-3, +3) CAR (-1, +1) 
Z stat 10.01 0.31* -0.68* 












Table 9: Political connections and non political connections 
We look to each firm that exchanges in the Euronext Lisbon, and we collect all the information 
related with the board members’ appointments these firms have done from January, 2000 to 
April, 2004. The appointments data is taken from the official website of Comissão do Mercado 
de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). We were forced to exclude 1 of the 47 firms that exchange in 
the Euronext Lisbon, because there is no information available on that topic. An appointment 
is classified as political (Political Appointment=1) if within the set of executives appointed, 
there is at least one executive that at any day prior to the day of the appointment held a 
political position such has Prime Minister, Minister or Secretary of State. For this purpose, we 
analyze the composition of the Portuguese Governments from January, 1980 to April, 2012. 
This data is taken from the Portuguese Government official website. The cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) used are all normalized, because since we are using daily data, this procedure 
help us to get more accurate results. The estimation window is from 250 days prior to the 
event to one day before the event. Robust p-values are indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 










Constant 0.000 -0.132 -0.386 
 (0.225) (0.765) (0.676) 
    
Observations 401 402 402 























Table 10: Political connections and non political connections – Different political 
dimensions 
The table displays results from regressions on daily CARs on political variables, as defined in 
section 4.2.. CARs were obtained using a estimation window of 250 days. The dataset 
comprises all appointments of board members made between January, 2000 and April, 2012 
by firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. The appointments data is taken from the official website of 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). We excluded one firm for which data 
was not available. An appointment is classified as political if any of the appointed board 
members held a political position after Jan-1980, and prior to the day of the appointment. We 
obtain the political data from the Portuguese Government official website. Robust p-values are 
indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 
    
Socialist Majority 0.000 -6.380*** -10.99*** 
 (0.237) (0.00634) (0.00143) 










 (0.0217) (0.00660) 
Ruling Party -6.804* -2.406** -5.455*** 
 (0.0666) (0.0125) (0.000263) 
Constant 0.000 -0.132 -0.386 
 (0.227) (0.766) (0.678) 
    
Observations 401 402 402 

























Table 11: Political and corporate dimensions of an appointment – The sum effect 
The table displays results from regressions on daily CARs on a set of corporate and political 
variables, as defined in section 4. The corporate variable observed in this table is the sum of 
corporate points. CARs were obtained using an estimation window of 250 days. The dataset 
comprises all appointments of board members made between January, 2000 and April, 2012 
by firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. The appointments data is taken from the official website of 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). We excluded one firm for which data 
was not available. An appointment is classified as political if any of the appointed board 
members held a political position after Jan-1980, and prior to the day of the appointment. We 
obtain the political data from the Portuguese Government official website. Robust p-values are 
indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 
    
Sum of corporate points 0.000 -0.013 -0.017 
 (0.294) (0.428) (0.524) 
Socialist Majority_sum 0.000 -0.067** -0.120*** 
 (0.212) (0.0221) (0.00476) 
Democratic Majority_sum 0.000 -0.07** -0.098** 
 (0.212) (0.0242) (0.0248) 
Ruling Party_sum 0.000 -0.025*** -0.063*** 
 (0.379) (0.00629) (0.000169) 
Balanced Appointment_sum 0.000 0.038* 0.066** 
 (0.247) (0.0549) (0.0248) 
Constant 0.000 0.131 0.025 
 (0.306) (0.801) (0.982) 
    
Observations 401 402 402 













Table 12: Political and corporate dimensions of an appointment – Maximum effect 
The table displays results from regressions on daily CARs on a set of corporate and political 
variables, as defined in section 4. The corporate variable observed in this table is the maximum 
of corporate points. CARs were obtained using an estimation window of 250 days. The dataset 
comprises all appointments of board members made between January, 2000 and April, 2012 
by firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. The appointments data is taken from the official website of 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). We excluded one firm for which data 
was not available. An appointment is classified as political if any of the appointed board 
members held a political position after Jan-1980, and prior to the day of the appointment. We 
obtain the political data from the Portuguese Government official website. Robust p-values are 
indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 
    
Max of corporate points 0.000 -0.016 -0.105 
 (0.345) (0.919) (0.758) 
Socialist Majority*max 0.000 -0.659** -1.129*** 
 (0.193) (0.0165) (0.00288) 
Democratic Majority*max 0.000 -0.603** -0.858** 
 (0.193) (0.0404) (0.0299) 
Balanced Appointment*max 0.000 0.320** 0.588*** 
 (0.150) (0.0386) (0.00794) 
Ruling Party*max 0.000 -0.251** -0.579*** 
 (0.594) (0.0112) (0.000329) 
Constant 0.000 -0.039 0.241 
 (0.454) (0.972) (0.925) 
    
Observations 401 402 402 












Table 13: Political and corporate dimensions of an appointment – The average effect 
The table displays results from regressions on daily CARs on a set of corporate and political 
variables, as defined in section 4. The corporate variable observed in this table is the average 
of corporate points. CARs were obtained using an estimation window of 250 days. The dataset 
comprises all appointments of board members made between January, 2000 and April, 2012 
by firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. The appointments data is taken from the official website of 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). We excluded one firm for which data 
was not available. An appointment is classified as political if any of the appointed board 
members held a political position after Jan-1980, and prior to the day of the appointment. We 
obtain the political data from the Portuguese Government official website. Robust p-values are 
indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 
    
Average of corporate points 0.000 0.0576 0.017 
 (0.601) (0.805) (0.975) 
Socialist Majority*average 0.000 -1.035** -1.755*** 
 (0.238) (0.0195) (0.00948) 
Democratic Majority*average 0.000 -1.057** -1.302* 
 (0.241) (0.0245) (0.0714) 
Ruling Party*average 0.000 -0.403** -0.858*** 
 (0.582) (0.0132) (0.00301) 
Balanced Appointment*average 0.000 0.498** 0.886** 
 (0.189) (0.0408) (0.0223) 
Constant 0.000 -0.369 -0.470 
 (0.168) (0.773) (0.875) 
    
Observations 401 402 402 













The table displays results from regressions on daily CARs on a set of political variables, as 
defined in section 4. CARs were obtained using an estimation window of 250 days. The dataset 
comprises only the appointments of board members in which the chairman of the board of 
directors is nominated. After that, we distinguish between appointments or reappointments. 
Once again, we consider only appointments made between January, 2000 and April, 2012 by 
firms listed in Euronext Lisbon. The appointments data is taken from the official website of 
Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM). An appointment is classified as political 
if any of the appointed board members held a political position after Jan-1980, and prior to the 
day of the appointment. We obtain the political data from the Portuguese Government official 
website. In the end, we get a sample of 39 firms and a total of 103 appointments. Robust p-
values are indicated in parentheses. Symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARs (-10, +10) CARs (-3, +3) CARs (-1, +1) 
    
First Appointment 0.000 -0.402 -1.574 
 (0.327) (0.711) (0.328) 
Socialist Majority 0.000 -6.691 -18.29*** 
 (0.361) (0.109) (0.00647) 
Democratic Majority 0.000 -4.593 -12.56* 
 (0.350) (0.256) (0.0711) 
Balanced Appointment 0.000 4.001* 9.635** 
 (0.336) (0.0784) (0.0121) 
Ruling Party 0.000 -4.257*** -10.40*** 
 (0.355) (0.00684) (0.000139) 
Constant 0.000 0.147 0.802 
 (0.327) (0.849) (0.509) 
    
Observations 102 103 103 
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